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The Interrogation Trilogy and the
Protections for Interrogated Suspects
in Canadian Law
Lisa Dufraimont*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent case of R. v. Sinclair1 constitutes the third instalment in
the so-called “interrogation trilogy” from the Supreme Court of Canada.2
The first case in the trilogy, R. v. Oickle,3 outlined the limits on police
interrogation imposed by the common law confessions rule. Then, in
R. v. Singh,4 the Court addressed the constitutional right to silence and its
operation in the interrogation context, including its relationship with the
confessions rule. Finally, in Sinclair, the Supreme Court has explained
how the constitutional right to counsel applies in the context of police
questioning a detainee. These three cases span more than a decade and
touch on different rules and rights under the common law and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5 But taken together, the
trilogy lays out the basic framework of legal safeguards available to
interrogated suspects under Canadian law.
Reaction to the cases in the trilogy has been swift, strong and mainly
negative. The primary criticism levelled by commentators — which was
also a concern of the dissenting judges in each case — is that the Supreme
Court decisions making up the interrogation trilogy do not go far enough

*
1

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University.
[2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, 77 C.R. (6th) 203 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sin-

clair”].
2
3

The phrase “interrogation trilogy” was coined by Binnie J. in Sinclair, id., at para. 77.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Oickle”].
4

“Singh”].

[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, 51 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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to safeguard suspects and control police abuses in the interrogation room.6
No doubt there are real questions about whether the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements on interrogation have struck the right balance between
state power and individual rights. At the same time, it seems important to
avoid focusing so much on the protections the law does not provide to
interrogated suspects that the protections the law does provide are
forgotten.
This paper aims to assess the interrogation trilogy and its impact on
the procedural safeguards surrounding police interrogation, with particular emphasis on the effect of the recent decision in Sinclair. The analysis
will focus on interrogation in the ordinary scenario where the suspect
knows he or she is interacting with police; undercover operations raise
different issues that go beyond the scope of this paper. Regarding the
protections available to suspects in the ordinary interrogation case, it will
be argued that despite the strong reaction from critics, the interrogation
trilogy has done little to change Canadian law. The Supreme Court has
now clearly rejected the idea that detainees should be permitted to cut off
interrogation by invoking Charter rights, and the implications of that
rejection will be discussed. The interrogation trilogy has also firmly
established the confessions rule as the central safeguard available to
interrogated suspects. Legitimate concerns have been raised about the
vitality of the confessions rule as a protection for individuals subjected to
police interrogation, but it will be argued that there are advantages to
privileging the confessions rule in this way.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERROGATION TRILOGY
Before analyzing the current state of the law, it will be useful to review the Supreme Court’s decisions in the interrogation trilogy. The

6

See, e.g., Don Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably Completes the Oickle and Singh Manual for
Coercive and Lawless Interrogation” (2010) 77 C.R. (6th) 303 [hereinafter “Sinclair Regrettably”];
Christine Boyle, “R. v. Sinclair: A Comparatively Disappointing Decision on the Right to Counsel”
(2010) 77 C.R. (6th) 310 [hereinafter “Boyle”]; Dale E. Ives & Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Singh —
A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous Consequences” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250
[hereinafter “Ives & Sherrin”]; Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the
Confessions Rule in Canada” (2005) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69 [hereinafter “Thomas”]; Dale E. Ives,
“Preventing False Confessions: Is Oickle Up to the Task?” (2007) 44 San Diego L. Rev. 477
[hereinafter “Ives”]; Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s Recipe for Coercive Interrogation”
(2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188.
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judgments in Oickle, Singh and the recent case of Sinclair will be
discussed in turn.
1. R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule
The confessions rule has deep roots in the common law of evidence,
dating back more than 200 years.7 It remains a vital part of Canadian law,
requiring that any out-of-court statement made by an accused person to a
person in authority be excluded from evidence unless the prosecution
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made voluntarily.8 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the confessions rule in Oickle,9 and
that case provides extensive guidance on the factors that should be
considered in the analysis of voluntariness.
Oickle involved the interrogation of a suspect in a series of arsons.
The suspect, Oickle, submitted to a polygraph test to probe his involvement, if any, in the fires. The polygraph test was administered in the
afternoon, after which the police immediately began a series of interrogations lasting late into the night. The police employed numerous tactics
calculated to put pressure on Oickle to confess. For example, they
exaggerated the reliability of the polygraph, repeatedly claiming that
because Oickle failed the test they already knew him to be guilty.10 They
also suggested to Oickle that if he did not confess, they might have to
interrogate his fiancée or subject her to a polygraph examination.11
Oickle made various self-incriminating statements and, ultimately, about
eight hours into his interaction with police, he confessed to setting seven
of the eight fires under investigation. He later participated in a reenactment at the scene of each fire. The trial judge admitted Oickle’s
statements, having determined that they were voluntary in all the
circumstances, and Oickle was convicted. The Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal held that the statements were involuntary and should have been
excluded, quashed the convictions and entered acquittals on all counts.
7
On the origins of the confessions rule in 18th-century England, see John H. Langbein,
The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 220-21.
8
See, e.g., R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 12 (S.C.C.).
It is worth noting that this rule only applies where the accused knows he or she is talking to a
“person is authority”; statements made in undercover operations are not covered by the confessions
rule.
9
Supra, note 3.
10
Id., at para. 84.
11
Id., at para. 94.
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The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by a 6-1 majority and reinstated Oickle’s convictions. The judgment of the majority was delivered
by Iacobucci J., who took the opportunity to elucidate the scope of the
confessions rule. He explained that, even in the Charter era, the confessions rule continues to apply as a matter of common law; the protections
for the accused under the Charter co-exist with the confessions rule, and
neither wholly subsumes the other.12 Justice Iacobucci further explained
that a restatement of the confessions rule was needed to respond to the
growing consciousness of the danger of false confessions. A primary
reason to exclude involuntary confessions is that they may be unreliable,
and the confessions rule should be informed by knowledge of the kinds
of interrogation techniques that are prone to produce false confessions.13
Ultimately, Iacobucci J. stressed that the confessions rule should be
defined with a view to the twin objectives of “protecting the rights of the
accused without unduly limiting society’s need to investigate and solve
crimes”.14
Justice Iacobucci explained that the confessions rule focuses on
“voluntariness, broadly understood”.15 Bright line rules are inconsistent
with the contextual nature of the voluntariness inquiry; trial judges must
consider all the circumstances to make the determination.16 Among the
factors that can alone or taken together vitiate the voluntariness of a
confession are express or implied threats or promises from the authorities17 and oppressive circumstances in the interrogation, as where the
questioning is intimidating and prolonged or the interrogators withhold
sleep, food or water.18 A confession will also be involuntary when
obtained from a suspect who lacked an operating mind.19 These factors
should be considered together as elements of the larger voluntariness
inquiry. Finally, the confessions rule requires a separate inquiry into
police trickery: where the police use tactics that would shock the conscience of the community, any resulting confession should be excluded
on that ground alone.20
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id., at para. 31.
Id., at para. 32.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 27.
Id., at paras. 47, 68.
Id., at paras 48-57.
Id., at paras. 58-62.
Id., at paras. 63-64.
Id., at paras. 65-67.
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According to Iacobucci J., where a trial judge arrives at a conclusion
on voluntariness after properly considering the totality of the circumstances, that finding is essentially factual and entitled to deference.21 In
the view of the majority, such was the case on the facts of Oickle. While
several features of the interrogation potentially raised voluntariness
issues, there was no error in the trial judge’s analysis of voluntariness
and no basis to overturn her finding on appeal.22 Justice Arbour, writing
in dissent, took a very different view of the interrogation, finding that
Oickle’s statements were made in response to various improper inducements from the authorities and unfair use of the “failed” polygraph.23
2. R. v. Singh and the Right to Silence
The Charter does not explicitly mention the right to silence, but the
Supreme Court has recognized that this right is protected under section
7.24 Writing for seven members of the Court in the landmark case of R. v.
Hebert,25 McLachlin J. explained that the right to silence is, in essence,
the right to choose freely whether or not to speak with authorities.26
Hebert involved a detainee who refused to speak with police but was
tricked into making incriminating statements by an undercover officer
placed in his cell. In these circumstances, the police effectively negated
the accused’s choice to remain silent and violated his section 7 rights.27
From the outset, the section 7 pre-trial right to silence recognized in
Hebert was defined narrowly. Anxious not to disrupt undercover operations generally, the majority explained that the right is only engaged
when the suspect is detained and when the undercover operative elicits
the statement.28 After Hebert, courts were uncertain whether and how
this Charter right to silence applied in the context of interrogation by
known police. A line of authority began to develop applying Hebert to
traditional police interrogation: where a detainee’s repeated assertions of the
right to silence were ignored in the context of unrelenting interrogation,
21

Id., at para. 71.
Id., at para. 104.
Id., at para. 150.
24
Section 7 provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
25
[1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hebert”].
26
Id., at 175.
27
Id., at 186-87.
28
Id., at 184-85.
22
23
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some courts held that the police had impermissibly negated the detainee’s
choice and therefore violated the section 7 right to silence.29 In these
earlier cases, the right to silence implications of persistent interrogation
were conceived as separate from any concerns about voluntariness, and the
section 7 pre-trial right to silence was sometimes used to exclude even
statements that had been ruled voluntary.30
The Supreme Court clarified the relationship between the confessions rule and the right to silence in Singh.31 The accused Singh was
arrested for murder after a stray bullet killed a bystander in a pub. Singh
consulted with counsel and, during subsequent police questioning, he
asserted his right to silence some 18 times. Police repeatedly affirmed
Singh’s right to silence but persisted with the interrogation, eventually
eliciting some incriminating statements from him. The trial judge
admitted the statements in evidence, finding that they were voluntary and
that they were not obtained in violation of the Charter right to silence.
The Supreme Court of Canada, by a 5-4 majority, dismissed Singh’s
appeal from conviction. Justice Charron, for the majority,32 rejected the
suggestion that police must cease questioning when a detainee asserts the
right to silence. Indeed, the majority held that when a detainee is interrogated by known police, the section 7 right to silence provides no protection beyond the protection already offered by the confessions rule; “the
confessions rule effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence”33 when a detainee is questioned by known police because, in that
context, “the two tests are functionally equivalent.”34 Concerns that
persistent interrogation in the face of repeated assertions of the right to
silence may have overwhelmed a detainee’s free will should be dealt
with — and may lead to exclusion — under the confessions rule.35 But
where the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a detainee’s
statement in the interrogation room was made voluntarily, there is no
room left for a Charter claim that the statement was obtained in a manner

29
See R. v. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Otis”];
R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282 (Ont. C.A.).
30
See, e.g., R. v. Reader, [2007] M.J. No. 225, 49 C.R. (6th) 301 (Man. Q.B.).
31
Supra, note 4.
32
Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ. concurred with
Charron J.
33
Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 39.
34
Id.
35
Id., at para. 47.
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that violated the section 7 right to silence.36 In the view of the majority,
then, since the trial judge had fully considered the circumstances and
found that the statements were voluntarily made, Singh’s Charter
argument could not succeed.
Justice Fish delivered a scathing dissent on behalf of four members
of the Court.37 The dissenters stressed that, once asserted, a detainee’s
right to silence should be respected and not deliberately undermined by
police. Justice Fish acknowledged the significant overlap in the protection offered by the confessions rule and the right to silence, but insisted
that in some circumstances a voluntary confession may nonetheless be
obtained in violation of section 7.38 Moreover, the dissenters argued that
if interrogators are permitted to ignore assertions of the right to silence
and persist in questioning detainees under their total control, detainees
“are bound to feel that their constitutional right to silence has no practical
effect and that they in fact have no choice but to answer”.39 According to
Fish J., Singh’s self-incriminating statements were obtained in violation
of his section 7 right to silence because the police persistently disregarded his choice to remain silent.
3. R. v. Sinclair and the Right to Counsel
Section 10(b) of the Charter affords a person who has been arrested
or detained the right “to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to
be informed of that right”. As is clear from its language, section 10(b)
imposes both informational and implementational duties on police: they
must both inform the detainee of the right to counsel and offer the
detainee a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right when the detainee
indicates a desire to do so.40 In Sinclair,41 the Supreme Court considered
the meaning of the right to counsel and the implementational duties of
police in the context of custodial interrogation. The Court split over the
issue, offering three very different interpretations of the right.
36

Id., at paras. 8, 37.
Justices Binnie, LeBel and Abella concurred with Fish J.
38
Singh, supra, note 4, at paras. 75-77.
39
Id., at para. 81.
40
R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, 33 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
41
Supra, note 1. See also the companion cases of R. v. McCrimmon, [2010] S.C.J. No. 36,
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 402, 77 C.R. (6th) 266 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Willier, [2010] S.C.J. No. 37, [2010] 2
S.C.R. 429, 77 C.R. (6th) 283 (S.C.C.), which applied the principles from Sinclair on different facts.
37
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Sinclair was arrested for the killing of another man. He was advised
of the reason for his arrest and of his right to counsel. He spoke to the
lawyer of his choice twice for about three minutes each time. Later the
same day, police interrogated Sinclair for five hours. He was told at the
outset that he did not have to say anything and that the interview was
being recorded and could be used in court. From the beginning, Sinclair
took the position that he did not want to say anything without his lawyer
present. The interrogator confirmed that Sinclair had the right not to
speak, but explained that he did not have the right to have his counsel
present during questioning.
To encourage him to talk, police tried to convince Sinclair that the
case against him was overwhelming. The interrogator repeatedly confronted Sinclair with incriminating evidence, even falsely claiming that
DNA evidence linked him to the crime scene. As questioning progressed,
Sinclair repeatedly expressed (four to five times) a desire to speak with
his lawyer and the intention to remain silent. Each time, the interrogator
indicated that Sinclair had a choice whether to speak, then proceeded to
further questioning. Eventually Sinclair described how he had fatally
stabbed the victim. Later on, Sinclair made incriminating statements to
an undercover officer in his cell and participated in a re-enactment at the
scene of the killing.
Chief Justice McLachlin and Charron J. delivered the judgment of
the five-member majority.42 They rejected the proposition that section
10(b) requires defence counsel to be present during custodial interrogation.43 Instead, the majority explained, the right to counsel that arises
upon detention is normally satisfied by the police doing two things: first,
offering an initial warning informing the detainee of his or her right to
counsel, and second, affording a reasonable opportunity to consult with
counsel when the detainee invokes the right. After this initial consultation, section 10(b) does not guarantee the detainee the right to consult
further with counsel in the course of the interrogation unless developments in the investigation indicate the need. Further consultation must be
permitted where changed circumstances make it necessary to serve the
purpose underlying section 10(b), which is to permit the detainee access
to legal advice relevant to her legal situation and, specifically, to her right

42
43

Justices Deschamps, Rothstein and Cromwell concurred.
Sinclair, supra, note 1, at paras. 2, 33-42.
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to choose whether to remain silent or cooperate with police.44 The
changes in circumstances that trigger a right to consult further with
counsel must be objectively observable; they include but are not limited
to efforts by police to involve the detainee in new procedures like lineups, changes in the detainee’s jeopardy and indications that the initial
information provided by counsel was deficient.45
Applying the law to the circumstances, the majority held that Sinclair’s right to counsel was not violated. Sinclair was properly advised of
his right to counsel and given an opportunity to exercise it by speaking to
his lawyer twice. While the police exaggerated the strength of their case,
the majority held that the right to consult further with counsel is not
automatically triggered by police employing the common tactic of
progressively revealing real or invented evidence against the detainee.46
Thus, on the facts, no changed circumstances arose during the interrogation to trigger a right to consult further with counsel.
Dissenting reasons were delivered by Binnie J., who took the view
that, together with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the confessions
rule and the right to silence in Oickle and Singh, the Sinclair majority’s
analysis of the right to counsel improperly favoured the state interest in
criminal investigations over individual rights.47 Justice Binnie agreed
with the majority that section 10(b) does not guarantee the right to have
one’s lawyer present during custodial interrogation.48 However, he
rejected as overly restrictive the majority’s holding that section 10(b)
grounds a right to consult further with counsel only in changed circumstances. In his view, a detainee’s right to consult further with counsel
would be triggered in the evolving circumstances of an ongoing interrogation when the detainee makes a request to speak with counsel that
satisfies two criteria. First, the request must be consistent with the
purpose of section 10(b), which is to ensure access to legal assistance;
requests designed to delay an investigation or serve as a distraction
would not meet this criterion. Second, to trigger a right to consult further
with counsel, the detainee’s request must be reasonably justified by
objective circumstances apparent to police at the time of the interroga-

44
45
46
47
48

Id., at paras. 2, 25, 32, 47.
Id., at paras. 49-55.
Id., at para. 60.
Id., at paras. 77, 93-99.
Id., at paras. 82, 100-102.
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tion.49 Emphasizing the risk of false confessions, Binnie J. disavowed a
view of interrogation as an endurance contest between the detainee who
has been advised not to speak and the police who try to wear him down.50
On the facts, Binnie J. concluded that Sinclair’s right to consult further with counsel was triggered after the police confronted him with what
they claimed was overwhelming evidence against him. At that point,
Sinclair’s renewed request to speak again with his lawyer was reasonable
and justified in the evolving circumstances of the interrogation. The
interrogator’s refusal to suspend the interrogation and allow Sinclair to
consult with his lawyer at that time was a breach of section 10(b)
warranting exclusion of all resulting statements.
Separate dissenting reasons were delivered by LeBel and Fish JJ.,
with whom Abella J. concurred. They argued that the majority’s interpretation of the right to counsel eroded the presumption of innocence and
the principle against self-incrimination. In particular, they objected that
the effect of the majority decisions in Sinclair and Singh was to grant
police a right of “unfettered and continuing access to the detainee, for the
purpose of conducting a custodial interview to the point of confession”.51
Justices LeBel and Fish interpreted section 10(b) as grounding an
ongoing right to counsel rather than a right that is exhausted after the
detainee’s initial consultation with a lawyer.52 Emphasizing the importance of the right to counsel for detainees who are vulnerable and subject
to the control of police, they insisted that detainees may exercise their
right to counsel at any time upon request, and that the reasonableness of
the request should not be subject to evaluation by police.53 Consequently,
LeBel and Fish JJ. concluded that Sinclair’s section 10(b) right to
counsel was violated when the police failed to suspend their interrogation
and permit him to consult with counsel after his numerous requests to be
allowed to do so. Like Binnie J., they would have excluded all Sinclair’s
incriminating statements under section 24(2) of the Charter.

49
50
51
52
53

Id., at paras. 80, 106.
Id., at paras. 89-90.
Id., at para. 190.
Id., at para. 154.
Id., at para. 177.
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III. IMPACT OF THE TRILOGY
For all the intense reaction they have provoked, the cases of the interrogation trilogy made few changes to Canadian law. Oickle was
primarily a restatement and consolidation of the existing law on voluntariness; what was new was the emphasis on reliability and the risk of
false confessions.54 The principal contribution of Singh and Sinclair was
to confirm that suspects are not entitled to stop a police interrogation by
stating the intention to remain silent or the desire to re-consult with
counsel. While perhaps disappointing, these holdings should not be
surprising. Apart from a detainee’s initial assertion of the right to counsel
— which obliges the police to hold off on questioning until the detainee
has had a chance to consult with a lawyer55 — detainees in Canada have
never had a power to cut off questioning simply by asserting their
Charter rights.56 In fact, the holdings of the majority in Singh and
Sinclair were, in large part, already expressly stated on behalf of a sevenmember majority of the Supreme Court when the Charter right to silence
was first recognized in Hebert. Justice McLachlin held that, notwithstanding the right to silence, police may try to persuade a detainee to
speak: “The state is not obliged to protect the suspect against making a
statement; indeed it is open to the state to use legitimate means of
persuasion to encourage the suspect to do so.”57 Hebert also affirmed that
police may question a detainee in the absence of counsel even after
counsel has been retained.58
It is true that Singh overturned the line of cases that had developed
under section 7 holding that even a voluntary statement can be excluded
on Charter grounds where police subject a detainee to unrelenting
interrogation despite repeated attempts to assert the right to silence.59
However, the majority’s disagreement was not with the proposition that
incessant questioning of a reticent suspect can violate the right to silence,
54
See, e.g., Gary T. Trotter, “False Confessions and Wrongful Confessions” (2004) 35
Ottawa L. Rev. 179, at 186 [hereinafter “Trotter”].
55
R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, 58 C.R. (3d) 97, at para. 23
(S.C.C.).
56
For example, R. v. Wood, [1994] N.S.J. No. 542, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 115
(N.S.C.A.) (“A detainee always has a right to a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel … [but]
once he is informed he cannot, without more, stop an interrogation … merely by purporting to
exercise his right to counsel again”).
57
Hebert, supra, note 25, at 176-77.
58
Id., at 184.
59
See, supra, notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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but rather with the premise that such a violation could occur without also
rendering the statement involuntary.60 Justice Charron explained that a
statement may be excluded in these factual circumstances under the
confessions rule because “police persistence in continuing the interview,
despite repeated assertions by the detainee that he wishes to remain
silent, may well raise a strong argument that any subsequently obtained
statement was not the product of a free will to speak to the authorities.”61
Thus, under Singh, these same considerations that might have been
conceived in the earlier cases only as going to the section 7 right to
silence can now be considered as factors going to voluntariness.62
The courts have taken notice: since Singh there have been several
reported cases where persistent questioning in the face of repeated
assertions of the right to silence has contributed to a confession being
excluded as involuntary.63 Not surprisingly, several other cases have
decided, as the trial judge did in Singh, that persistent questioning did not
render the statement involuntary in the circumstances.64 But the issue
60

Tellingly, even as she suggested that the analysis should be undertaken under the confessions rule, Charron J. cited with approval Otis, supra, note 29, in which the Quebec Court of Appeal
found a violation of the Charter right to silence.
61
Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 47.
62
In the words of Charron J., id., at para. 37, “voluntariness, as it is understood today, requires that the court scrutinize whether the accused was denied his or her right to silence”.
63
See, e.g., R. v. S. (D.), [2010] O.J. No. 5748, 2011 ONSC 260 (Ont. S.C.J.) (the accused’s
statements were involuntary when the police violated his right to counsel and persistently and at
times confrontationally questioned him over his repeated protestations that he had nothing to say); R.
v. C. (S.E.), [2009] M.J. No. 463, 2009 MBQB 242, at para. 29 (Man. Q.B.) (a confession was
involuntary where the accused was intoxicated and drowsy and subjected in the middle of the night
to “continued questioning over an extended period of time despite the defendant expressing his wish
(on 13 occasions) to follow his lawyer’s advice not to make a statement”); R. v. Hankey, [2008] O.J.
No. 2548, at para. 37 (Ont. S.C.J.) (the accused’s statements were involuntary because of “the
cumulative effect of the context of the persistent questioning of the accused combined with the
statements by the officer … which eroded the confidence of the accused in the legal advice he had
received from counsel”); R. c. Côté, [2008] J.Q. no 7951, 2008 QCCS 3749 (Que. S.C.), affd [2011]
S.C.J. No. 46, 2011 SCC 46 (S.C.C.) (statements obtained from the exhausted, claustrophobic
accused after a lengthy detention, a patterns of violating her rights and persistent questioning in the
face of repeated assertions of her right to silence were excluded as involuntary).
64
See R. v. Borkowsky, [2008] M.J. No. 20, 225 Man. R. (2d) 127, at para. 48 (Man. C.A.)
(in deciding that the accused’s statement was voluntary despite nine assertions that he wished to
follow his lawyer’s advice and remain silent, the trial judge “made a judgment call that [was]
supported by the record”); R. v. King, [2011] O.J. No. 532, 2011 ONSC 687 (Ont. S.C.J.) (the
accused’s statements were voluntary despite 16 assertions of the right to silence and police
misstating the law by suggesting it was his last chance to make a statement); R. v. Kembo, [2009]
B.C.J. No. 2809, 2009 BCSC 1879, at para. 40 (B.C.S.C.) (the accused’s statements were voluntary
after “the police chose to ignore his express wish to remain silent and used legitimate means of
persuasion to get him to speak”); R. v. Dunsford, [2009] S.J. No. 373, 335 Sask. R. 43, at para. 16
(Sask. Q.B.) (confession voluntary where “the accused, under persistent questioning by well
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remains very much alive in the confessions cases.65 Contrary to the fears
expressed by some, then, Singh has not had the effect of sanctioning utter
disregard for assertions of the right to silence in the interrogation room.66
By holding that concerns about the right to silence are subsumed by
the voluntariness inquiry in the context of questioning by known police,
the majority in Singh positioned the confessions rule as the central
procedural safeguard for interrogated suspects. The same emphasis on
the broad, residual protection offered by the confessions rule also appears
in Sinclair. Admittedly, the connection between the right to counsel and
the confessions rule is not as close as the nexus between the right to
silence and the confessions rule. As the majority in Sinclair pointed out,
voluntariness does not mean that the right to counsel has necessarily
been respected, and neither does compliance with section 10(b) imply
voluntariness.67 Still, McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. suggested in
Sinclair that the confessions rule buttresses the right to counsel in the
interrogation context: “We do not agree with the suggestion that our
interpretation of s. 10(b) will give carte blanche to the police. This
argument overlooks the requirement that confessions must be voluntary
in the broad sense now recognized by the law.”68
Moreover, in rejecting the suggestion of Binnie J. that the Court
should recognize broader rights to re-consult with counsel under section
10(b), the majority in Sinclair declared that “[t]he better approach is to
continue to deal with claims of subjective incapacity or intimidation
under the confessions rule.”69 Arguably, this reasoning implies that even
prepared highly skilled interrogators, was rather easily persuaded to abandon his resolve, supported
by his lawyer’s advice, not to respond to questions about the alleged crime”); R. v. Kematch, [2008]
M.J. No. 468, 244 Man. R. (2d) 210 (Man. Q.B.) (statements by the accused were voluntary and
motivated by conscience, even though he told police on a few occasions that his lawyer told him not
to say anything); R. v. Shi, [2008] O.J. No. 5950, 2008 ONCJ 799 (Ont. C.J.) (the accused’s
statement was voluntary despite his stating several times during the interrogation that his lawyer told
him to remain silent).
65
See R. v. Rybak, [2008] O.J. No. 1715, 90 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 190 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 311 (S.C.C.) (“A lengthy interview, coupled with repeated
refusals to answer some questions without first speaking to a lawyer, mandate close judicial scrutiny
of the admissibility of the record of interview”).
66
See Suhail Akhtar, “Whatever Happened to the Right to Silence?” (2009) 62 C.R. (6th)
73, at 85 (“After the decision in Singh, there was some complaint that the police had the right to ride
roughshod over the wishes of the accused … [but s]uch an approach, aside from Charter implications, would more than likely render any statement made inadmissible through the voluntariness
rubric”).
67
Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 29.
68
Id., at para. 62.
69
Id., at para. 60.
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if repeated assertions of one’s desire to speak again with one’s lawyer do
not give rise to a right to consult further with counsel under the majority’s changed circumstances test, they may militate against a finding of
voluntariness in the particular circumstances. Even in the months since
Sinclair was decided, courts have acknowledged the ways in which the
section 10(b) right to counsel and the voluntariness inquiry can be
interrelated.70 Consider the case of R. v. Delormier,71 in which statements
from the accused were excluded as involuntary for a variety of reasons,
including veiled threats from police that the accused’s children might be
taken away if she did not cooperate. For present purposes, the case is
notable because Power J. considered the accused’s repeated requests to
have her lawyer present or speak with him again as a factor tending to
suggest that her statements were involuntary.
In sum, the interrogation trilogy has not created any dramatic movement in Canadian law, but the cases do have some interesting implications. Taken together, Singh and Sinclair clearly reject the notion that an
interrogated suspect should have the power to cut off interrogation by
invoking the right to silence or the right to re-consult with counsel. These
two cases also emphasize the role of the confessions rule as outlined in
Oickle in providing broad protection for interrogated suspects that
enhances and complements the safeguards available under sections 7 and
10(b) of the Charter. These two features of the interrogation trilogy,
including their advantages and disadvantages, will be explored for the
balance of this paper.

IV. NO CUT-OFF RULES
The most controversial feature of the interrogation trilogy is that it
denies interrogated suspects the power to stop police questioning by
asserting their Charter rights. Under the well-known Miranda rules in the
70

See, e.g., R. v. Gonzales, [2011] O.J. No. 395, 2011 ONSC 543, at para. 23 (Ont. S.C.J.)
(failure to re-inform accused of his rights to silence and counsel when he faced new jeopardy
breached s. 10(b) and raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness because the accused may have
been given “the impression that he was required to give a statement”); R. v. Somogyi, [2010] O.J.
No. 4350, 221 C.R.R. (2d) 49 (Ont. S.C.J.) (statements drawn out of an autistic man with relentless,
aggressive questioning that created an atmosphere of oppression were involuntary, and this
conclusion was reinforced by the fact that police breached the accused’s right to counsel when they
did not permit him to consult further with counsel after it became clear that he did not understand
that the duty counsel he had earlier spoken to was a lawyer).
71
[2010] O.J. No. 5708, 2010 ONSC 7191 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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United States, custodial interrogation must cease when the detainee
asserts the right to remain silent, and police are prohibited from questioning detainees in the absence of their lawyers once they have asserted the
right to counsel.72 The appellants in Singh and Sinclair urged the Supreme Court to adopt such “questioning cut-off rules”73 under the
Charter. Singh argued that police should be required to stop questioning a
detainee who states an intention not to speak,74 while Sinclair submitted
that police must cease questioning when a detainee requests the opportunity to consult again with counsel.75 These arguments were largely
accepted by the dissenters in the two cases. The dissenting judgment in
Singh is somewhat unclear on this point: some of its language suggests
that even one assertion of the right to silence should put an end to police
questioning,76 but other parts of the judgment trace the violation of
section 7 to the “persistent disregard” of the accused’s choice to remain
silent.77 In Sinclair, by contrast, the dissenting judgment of LeBel and
Fish JJ. clearly accepts that detainees have a right to cut off questioning
by asserting their Charter rights even once. In their words, “detainees
who demand access to counsel before being further subjected to relentless interrogation against their will … are constitutionally entitled ‘to
speak to [their] lawyer NOW’.”78
Whatever the position of the dissenting judges, the majority judgments in Singh and Sinclair have firmly established that questioning cutoff rules do not form a part of Canadian constitutional law. The majority
judges offered two justifications for their rejection of American-style
interrogation cut-off rules. First, they argued that giving detainees the
unilateral power to stop interrogations would upset the balance between
individual rights and society’s interest in enforcing the criminal law.79 In
Singh, the majority went so far as to claim that the argument that interro72

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1966).
This descriptor is drawn from the American legal literature: e.g., Paul G. Cassell, “Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions — and from Miranda” (1998) 88
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497, at fn. 216.
74
Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 6.
75
Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 18.
76
Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 70 (“A right that need not be respected after it has been
firmly and unequivocally asserted any number of times is a constitutional promise that has not been
kept”) (emphasis in original).
77
Id., at para. 95. See also id., at para. 70 (“I … find it unnecessary to decide whether 18
times is too many or once is too few”).
78
Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 177.
79
See, e.g., id., at para. 63.
73
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gation should cease upon assertion of the detainee’s right to silence
“ignores the state interest in the effective investigation of crime”.80 At
least in its strong form, this justification for rejecting cut-off rules seems
misguided. The long American experience with such rules fatally
undermines any claim that their adoption would devastate Canadian law
enforcement.81 This justification carries some limited force, however, in
its weaker form. Adopting cut-off rules would shut down some interrogations and thereby hamper criminal investigations in some measure, and
even a modest effect on law enforcement seems to be a legitimate (but
not decisive) factor in considering the scope of individual rights.
The second justification offered by the majority for rejecting cut-off
rules is that such rules are grounded in the mistaken notion that being
compelled to endure questioning amounts to compulsory selfincrimination.82 In principle at least, there does seem to be a distinction
between being made to listen and being forced to speak. On the other
hand, the psychological pressures of police interrogation, particularly in
the context of detention, may be strong enough to make it unrealistic to
expect detainees to exercise their right to silence in the face of persistent
questioning.83 Sensitivity to the inherent pressures of police interrogation
probably explains why most commentators view the Supreme Court’s
rejection of cut-off rules as disappointing. It appears that, in Singh and
Sinclair, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to guarantee that the
Charter rights to silence and counsel, once asserted, can be effectively
exercised in the interrogation room.
It would be a mistake, however, to focus on this missed opportunity
and forget the safeguards that do exist for interrogated suspects in
Canadian law. The fact that police may continue to question a detainee
even after an assertion of the right to silence or counsel does not mean,
as Don Stuart has suggested, that “the right to remain silent does not …
exist”.84 It does not, as the dissenters wrote in Sinclair, grant police the
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Supra, note 4, at para. 45.
See, e.g., Ives & Sherrin, supra, note 6, at 251-53; Singh, id., at para. 89 (Fish J., dissenting).
Singh, id., at para. 28; Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 63.
83
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, “Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly small Social Costs” (1996) 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 500, at 558 (the distinction between
compelling a detainee to submit to questioning and compelling a self-incriminating statement should
be abandoned because “[i]n the context of custodial interrogation, there is only a slender conceptual
difference here, not a practical difference that can possibly matter”).
84
Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably”, supra, note 6, at 307.
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right to interrogate a detainee “to the point of confession”.85 The majority
judges in both Singh and Sinclair were at pains to point out that where an
interrogation becomes overbearing and negates the detainee’s freedom of
choice about whether to speak to authorities, the right to silence will be
violated and any resulting statement will be involuntary and inadmissible
pursuant to the confessions rule.
The safeguards available in Canadian law arguably have some advantages over a system of interrogation cut-off rules. As the majority
pointed out in Sinclair, empirical research in the United States indicates
that around 80 per cent of suspects waive their Miranda rights to silence
and counsel.86 This is not to suggest that those rights are unimportant; no
doubt they operate as crucial safeguards for the minority of detainees
who invoke them. What the high waiver rate does show is that cut-off
rules in and of themselves cannot function as an adequate systemic
response to the danger of coercion in police interrogation. Surely it
would be preferable to conduct a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances of every confession and exclude all coerced statements whether
the rights to silence and counsel were invoked or not. This is what the
confessions rule aims to do.
Potentially, a robust confessions rule could co-exist with interrogation cut-off rules, in which case there is no need to choose between them
and interrogated suspects could have the benefit of both. Yet, the American experience casts some doubt on the idea that the voluntariness
inquiry would maintain its vitality alongside a system centred on warnings and cut-off rules. In the United States, as in Canada, confessions are
supposed to be admissible only if they are voluntary.87 But commentators
have observed that, since the Miranda regime was adopted, the admissibility of a confession in an American court depends almost entirely on
whether the proper warnings were given and the necessary waivers of
85

Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 190.
Id., at para. 41; Richard A. Leo, “Inside the Interrogation Room” (1995) 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 266, at 276 (reporting a study involving real police interrogations, in which 78 per cent
of interrogated suspects waived their Miranda rights); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, “Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda” (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev.
839, at 860 (discussing an empirical study in which 79.9 per cent of suspects waived their Miranda
rights throughout the custodial interrogation, while another 3.9 per cent initially waived their rights
but invoked them at some point during questioning).
87
The voluntariness standard applies as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (U.S. Sup. Ct.
1936).
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rights obtained.88 American judges appear content to rely on the safeguards provided by Miranda, to the exclusion of a thorough voluntariness inquiry. In the words of Steven Duke, “Miranda is a substantial
factor in the twenty-first century reality that the suppression of confessions by trial judges on involuntariness grounds is almost as rare today as
four-legged chickens.”89
Of course, one can only speculate about what would happen to the
confessions rule if interrogation cut-off rules were incorporated into
Canadian law. Yet one cannot dismiss the possibility that adopting
Miranda-type rules, including questioning cut-off rules, would undermine the voluntariness standard for confessions. Moreover, there is every
reason to expect that such cut-off rules would provide no protection at all
to most interrogated suspects, because they would never invoke their
rights. By contrast, the confessions rule has the advantage of requiring a
contextual inquiry into the whole circumstances of every confession.

V. VOLUNTARINESS AT THE CENTRE
The interrogation trilogy identifies the confessions rule as the central
safeguard for interrogated suspects, a safeguard that supports and
overlaps with the Charter rights to silence and counsel. This emphasis on
the broad protection offered by the confessions rule was criticized by the
dissenting judges in Sinclair and Singh. In the words of LeBel and Fish
JJ., “the suggestion … that our residual concerns can be meaningfully
addressed by way of the confessions rule … ignores what we have
learned about the dynamics of custodial interrogation and renders
pathetically anemic the entrenched constitutional rights to counsel and
silence.”90 Clearly these comments bespeak a high degree of skepticism
about the confessions rule. The analysis in the pages that follow will
consider whether this skepticism is justified. The reasons to mistrust the
protection offered by the confessions rule include its common law status,
its indeterminacy and the results of several recent Supreme Court of
Canada cases considering voluntariness. On the other hand, the courts’
88
For example, Charles D. Weisselberg, “Mourning Miranda” (2008) 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519,
at 1595 [hereinafter “Weisselberg”] (from a law enforcement perspective, “the reason Miranda is
advantageous is that it has practically displaced voluntariness determinations”).
89
Steven B. Duke, “Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?” (2007) 10 Chapman
L. Rev. 551, at 562.
90
Sinclair, supra, note 1, at para. 184 (emphasis in original).
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focus on the confessions rule has real virtues that arguably outweigh
these concerns.
One potential concern about relying on the confessions rule as the
principal protection for interrogated suspects is that it seems incongruous
to favour a common law rule over constitutional standards. At least in the
context of interrogation, the section 7 right to silence in particular seems
almost to disappear in the shadow of the confessions rule. That constitutional right has no independent remedy in this context because Singh
established that the voluntariness inquiry contains and resolves any
question about right to silence in interrogation.91 One might argue that
this approach negates the section 7 right to silence.92 Yet, if we take the
view that the actual availability of procedural protections matters more
than their legal source, then relying on the confessions rule seems less
problematic: potentially, the right to silence can be vindicated as fully
through the confessions rule as through a distinct section 7 analysis. Of
course, if the confessions rule were abrogated, it would become
necessary for Courts to decide the limits of the right to silence under
section 7. For now, according to the Supreme Court, the confessions rule
adequately protects the suspect’s right to remain silent in the face of
interrogation.
The more challenging objection to the courts’ reliance on the residual
protection offered by the confessions rule is that that protection is weak
and inadequate. Certainly there are reasons to doubt its adequacy. For
one thing, the confessions rule can be frustratingly indeterminate. The
rule requires a contextual analysis of the totality of the circumstances
relevant to voluntariness. And while the law has a lot to say about the
factors that bear on voluntariness, the reality is that trial judges enjoy
wide latitude in reaching a conclusion on the issue. As the rule was
outlined in Oickle, it imposes few firm limits on interrogation. Oickle did
indicate that confessions extracted with actual or threatened physical
violence will be involuntary,93 but it appears that no other interrogation
tactics are entirely prohibited under the rule. Even when police offer a
quid pro quo for a confession in the form of a threat or a promise, the
Court held that such inducements only vitiate voluntariness when they
“are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of
91

See supra, notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
See Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably”, supra, note 6, at 307 (arguing that the right to silence
no longer exists because it has no Charter remedy).
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Oickle, supra, note 3, at paras. 48, 53.
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the subject has been overborne”.94 Some commentators have suggested
that the confessions rule should be strengthened by recognizing firmer
limits on police conduct,95 but the Supreme Court in Oickle disavowed
“[h]ard and fast” rules as inconsistent with the overall contextual
approach to voluntariness.96
The very language of the confessions rule attests to its indeterminacy: to be admissible, confessions must be proven “voluntary”. Historically, the rule excluded as involuntary those statements obtained by “fear
of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in
authority”,97 but the modern cases, especially Oickle, indicate that threats
and promises are only a part of a larger inquiry into voluntariness. Often,
as in Oickle, the language of voluntariness is left to stand essentially on
its own as the full articulation of the test. When other language is used, it
is the language of free will, choice and the overborne will.98 Without
engaging in philosophical debates about the nature of human action, how
can a judge answer the question whether a statement was made voluntarily, as a product of the suspect’s free will?99 In almost all cases, there will
be some element of choice and some external constraint or pressure that,
together, give rise to the statement.100 A cursory review of the confessions cases reveals that involuntariness does not equate with a total
absence of volitional action akin to automatism. On the other hand,
94
Id., at para. 57. On this point, see R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, [2007] 1 S.C.R.
500, 44 C.R. (6th) 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”].
95
See, e.g., Ives, supra, note 6, at 498 (suggesting that the Court should “partially abandon
the totality of the circumstances approach to assessing voluntariness and, instead, begin the process
of regulating more directly the conduct of interrogations and permissibility of certain interrogation
techniques”). See also Lisa Dufraimont, “The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era:
Current Law and Future Directions” in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds. (2008) 40
S.C.L.R. (2d) 249, at 258-60 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”].
96
Oickle, supra, note 3, at para. 47.
97
R. v. Ibrahim, [1914] A.C. 599, at 609 (P.C.), adopted in Canada in R. v. Prosko, [1922]
S.C.J. No. 6, 63 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.).
98
For example, the majority in Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 53, stated that under both the
confessions rule and the right to silence, “[t]he ultimate question is whether the accused exercised
free will by choosing to make a statement.”
99
See Ronald J. Allen, “Miranda’s Hollow Core” (2006) 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 71, at 76 (arguing that it is impossible to “distinguish between ‘free will’ and ‘compelled’ statements. … it
seems inescapable that either free will always exists in the sense that one always has choices one can
make, or more likely it never exists because we live in a deterministic world”).
100
Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions Rule and the Charter” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 517, at
540 [hereinafter “Stewart”] (“in a typical case of wrongful pressure, the conduct of the person whose
will is said to be overborne is fully voluntary and rational; it is a deliberate, though highly
constrained, effort to avoid an unpleasant consequence”).
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recalling the principle that the police may use “legitimate means of
persuasion”101 to encourage a suspect to speak, it seems equally clear that
voluntariness does not require an unconstrained will, liberated from any
external influence. Ultimately, the voluntariness rule demands a will that
is not entirely free but free enough — free from pressure that, in all the
circumstances, seems illegitimate. Inescapably, it is a muddy, linedrawing exercise. The indeterminacy of the confessions rule gives some
reason to be skeptical that the voluntariness standard can provide
meaningful, consistent protection to interrogated suspects.
This skepticism has been fed, in recent years, with unease about a
number of cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld findings of
voluntariness in troubling circumstances. Oickle and Singh are examples
of cases where the Court has countenanced police conduct that pushes
the line between persuasion and coercion.102 Another example is R. v.
Spencer,103 where the Supreme Court reinstated the trial judge’s finding
that the accused’s confessions to robbery were voluntary even though the
police withheld a visit to his girlfriend until he “cleaned his slate”.104 The
trial judge concluded that this inducement was not strong enough to raise
a reasonable doubt about whether the accused’s free will was overborne,
and a majority of the Supreme Court agreed. Some have suggested that
Spencer changed the voluntariness test in the Crown’s favour, since the
trial judge relied on a Court of Appeal holding in R. v. Paternak105 that
voluntariness turns on whether “the detainee has lost any meaningfully
independent ability to choose to remain silent, and has become a mere
tool in the hands of the police”.106 However, the majority of the Supreme
Court in Spencer explicitly distanced itself from this “colourful language”107 and upheld the trial judge’s findings on the basis that he
101

Hebert, supra, note 25, at 176-77.
Don Stuart has written that “the Supreme Court rulings on voluntariness on the facts of
Oickle and Singh give no comfort for those seeking such judicial control on aggressive interrogation
determined to get the detainee to confess at all costs. The Court has proved far too tolerant of truly
coercive interrogations in these high profile cases. ...” Stuart, “Sinclair Regrettably”, supra, note 6,
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repeatedly referred to the appropriate standard of proof and to the
decision in Oickle.108 In light of this reasoning, it is difficult to maintain
that Spencer should be read as changing the voluntariness test. Still,
Spencer represents one further instance of the Supreme Court finding
confessions voluntary despite police use of some questionable interrogation techniques.
A partial answer to worries about these troubling cases is that the
Supreme Court has maintained a high standard of deference to trial
judges on the issue of voluntariness,109 a deference that is arguably
appropriate in light of the fact-driven, contextual nature of the inquiry.
Notwithstanding this deference argument, the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions on the facts of confessions cases, coupled with the indeterminacy of the rule itself, raise legitimate concerns about the strength of the
protection that the confessions rule offers to interrogated suspects.
It will be argued here, however, that these real concerns about the
confessions rule are outweighed by the benefits of privileging it as the
central safeguard for interrogated suspects. The principal benefits are
three. First, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, the accused
benefits from certain procedural advantages when relying on the confessions rule. The Crown bears the burden of establishing voluntariness and
involuntary statements are automatically excluded from evidence,
whereas the accused must establish a Charter breach and statements
obtained in violation of Charter rights are only excluded under section
24(2) if their admission “would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute”.110 Second, as has already been discussed, the confessions rule
casts its protection over all interrogated suspects, since all confessions
must be shown to be voluntary before they can be entered in evidence.
This wide scope of protection means that the confessions rule is better
suited to be the central protection for interrogated suspects than, for
example, the questioning cut-off rules that were rejected in Singh and
Sinclair.
108
See id., at para. 19:
Arguably, taken out of context, the impugned passage from Paternak appears to overstate
the test in Oickle since it does not make reference to the quid pro quo or to the reasonable
doubt standard. However, it is clear from reading the trial judge’s reasons that he did not
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proof and to this Court’s decision in Oickle.
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See Stewart, supra, note 100, at 543.
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The third advantage of the confessions rule is the breadth of the voluntariness analysis, which encompasses a wide range of factors concerning the risk of false confessions, the limits of acceptable police conduct,
the psychological dynamics of interrogation and the vulnerabilities of the
individual suspect. It is well established that the confessions rule has two
main purposes: to exclude unreliable statements and to protect individuals from coercive and improper interrogation tactics.111 Since the touchstone of admissibility is “voluntariness, broadly understood”,112 a
confession can be excluded because of concerns about its reliability, on
grounds related to improper police conduct, or for both kinds of reasons.
In Oickle, the Supreme Court confirmed that voluntariness can be
vitiated by a range of factors including threats and promises, oppression,
a failure to meet the operating mind requirement and shocking police
trickery. Beyond these categories, the Court drew liberally on social
science literature on the psychology of interrogation and encouraged
courts to approach the voluntariness inquiry mindful of the tactics and
factors that contribute to false confessions.113 For example, Iacobucci J.
emphasized the need to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of individual
suspects114 and conscious that the common tactic of confronting suspects
with “non-existent evidence” risks overwhelming even the innocent, who
may come to believe that their “protestations of innocence are futile”.115
The already broad range of considerations bearing on voluntariness
has arguably now been further expanded by Singh and Sinclair. As
discussed above, Singh expressly stated that unrelenting questioning of a
suspect in the face of repeated assertions of the right to silence can make
a confession involuntary. This result could well have been achieved even
before Singh by applying the doctrine of oppression, but if there was any
doubt on the matter it has now been resolved by Singh.116 Moreover, as
111
For example, Stewart, supra, note 100, at 527; Singh, id., at para. 21 (“Although historically the confessions rule was more concerned with the reliability of confessions than the protection
against self-incrimination, this no longer holds true in the post-Charter era”).
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113
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Id., at para. 43.
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argued above, Sinclair can be read as suggesting that repeated requests to
speak with one’s lawyer, like repeated assertions of the right to silence,
can militate against a finding of voluntariness.
The myriad factors that can affect the voluntariness of a confession
have the disadvantage of adding to the indeterminacy of the confessions
rule; they cannot be reduced to a test to be applied with analytical
precision. But the breadth of the inquiry makes the confessions rule a
good vehicle for addressing the complex policy issues surrounding
interrogation and confessions. The confessions rule gives the courts a
way to respond not just to abusive police tactics, but also to vulnerable
suspects and unreliable statements.
Admittedly, certain of the themes of the confessions rule identified
here need to be developed further in future cases. For example, vulnerabilities of individual suspects resulting from factors like youth and
mental disability are known to be a major factor contributing to false
confessions.117 While the Supreme Court in Oickle cautioned judges to
be mindful of these vulnerabilities in the voluntariness inquiry, there was
little discussion of how that analysis should work.118 Few would deny
that the law should develop a more sophisticated response to the vulnerabilities of interrogated suspects; the advantage of the confessions rule is
that it provides a doctrinal opening for that development. In her critique
of Sinclair, Christine Boyle observed that the majority’s discussion of
section 10(b) seems insensitive to the “varying vulnerabilities of detained
persons”.119 She noted that it seems “disturbing … that agents of the state
should be able to keep women isolated, not to mention people with
mental disabilities and people with good reason to be terrified of police
interrogation would result in a voluntary confession despite breaching the suspect’s right to silence:
Stewart, supra, note 100, at 539. In this example, the youthful and vulnerable suspect asserts the
intention to remain silent but is persuaded to speak after repeated requests from the police. Stewart
posits that there are no improper inducements, oppression or other factors that would make the
statement involuntary. The problem is that the example as framed contains factors that could
combine to vitiate voluntariness: the suspect’s youth and vulnerability and the persistence of the
police. It also seems problematic to posit that there is no oppression, since the persistent questioning
would seem capable of creating an atmosphere of oppression.
117
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officers”.120 One answer to this concern is that, by emphasizing the
residual protection offered by the confessions rule, the majority in
Sinclair provided a means for those problems of vulnerability to be
addressed.
In sum, with its multidimensional contextual analysis, the confessions rule has the potential to ground meaningful responses to the
overlapping problems of false confessions and police abuse in the
interrogation room. Of course, much depends on how individual judges
apply the voluntariness standard. As Don Stuart observed in his commentary on Sinclair, “the hope for a better balance now lies … with trial
judges presiding over voluntary confession voir dires.”121 There seems to
be some reason for optimism, as a review of the confessions cases
reveals that trial judges often show sensitivity to the coercive pressure of
interrogation in ruling confessions involuntary.122

VI. CONCLUSION
While the cases of the interrogation trilogy did not work any major
change in Canadian law, they have provoked a strong reaction that merits
a close analysis of their implications. Taken together, Singh and Sinclair
have confirmed that American-style questioning cut-off rules find no
place in Canadian law. There are, in short, no magic words that a
detainee can utter to bring an end to an interrogation. Since such cut-off
rules amount to simple procedural guarantees capable of ensuring that
unequivocal assertions of the rights to silence and counsel are given full
effect, and since the majority’s reasons for rejecting them in Singh and
Sinclair were not entirely persuasive, it seems fair to conclude that the
Court has missed an opportunity to enhance the protection of these
Charter rights.
At the same time, the significance of this missed opportunity should
not be exaggerated. Even if questioning cut-off rules were adopted in
Canada, they would probably not assist most interrogated suspects
because only a small minority could be expected to invoke their rights.
The dangers of coercion in the interrogation room clearly require a
broader systemic response. Despite its acknowledged flaws, the confes120
121
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sions rule as outlined in Oickle is well suited to provide that broader
protection. Consequently, in Singh and Sinclair, the majority of the
Supreme Court positioned the confessions rule as the central safeguard
for interrogated suspects, a safeguard that supports and complements the
Charter rights to silence and counsel.
American scholar Charles Weisselberg has written that the Miranda
regime of warnings and waivers should be abandoned because it fails to
provide meaningful protection for most people subjected to custodial
interrogation. In its place, he advocated a system in which judges
would be required to assess the voluntariness of statements in light of
all the circumstances, including suspects’ age, education, the existence
of any mental disabilities or disorders, the application of sophisticated
interrogation tactics, express and implied promises, and other factors,
shorn of the unwarranted assumption that all suspects somehow
understand form warnings and are empowered thereby.123

A Canadian reader cannot help but be reminded of our confessions rule,
which at least has the potential to take account of these factors that are so
crucial to the dynamics of police interrogation.
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